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"FACT-FINDING WITHOUT FACTS":
A CONVERSATION WITH NANCY COMBS
This roundtable was convened at 10:45 a.m., Friday, March 25, by its moderator, Linda
A. Malone of William & Mary Law School, who introduced the speaker, Nancy Combs of
William & Mary Law School. Professor Combs' presentation was followed by remarks from
the foll~wing discussants: Margaret deGuzman of the Irish Center for Human Rights; Marco
Divac Oberg of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Saira Mohamed of the University of California at Berkeley School of Law; and Dan Saxon of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Office of the Prosecutor.
REMARKS BY NANCY COMBS*

I am tremendously grateful to ASIL for convening this panel to discuss my book, FactFinding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International Criminal
Convictions. I am really looking forward to the insights of this group of esteemed international
law scholars. Although there is much that I would love to discuss, time constraints compel
me to confine my own remarks to an exceedingly short description of the book's empirical
conclusions.
My conclusions stem from my review of thousands of pages of transcripts from the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL), and the Special Panels of East Timor (Special Panels). From this review, I discovered
that many international witnesses are unable to convey the kind of information that court
personnel expect -and need-if they are to have confidence in the factual determinations
they make. Sometimes witnesses claim not to know the sought-after information, while in
other instances, communication breaks down as a result of the questioning process. Moreover,
the clear information witnesses do convey during in-court testimony is often inconsistent
with the information appearing in the witness's pre-trial statement. As a consequence, I
conclude that the tribunals under study are beset by a variety of fact-finding impediments
that make it very difficult to tell who did what to whom with any measure of certainty.
So what sort of problems did I discover? As noted, witnesses frequently have difficulty
answering certain basic factual questions. For instance, with some notable exceptions, witnesses have trouble providing the dates of the events that they witnessed. Additionally,
they have trouble estimating distances, duration, and numbers, and making sense of maps,
photographs, and sketches. The failure to answer these sorts of questions can substantially
impair a tribunal's ability to find facts. The failure to date events can conceal inconsistencies
between witness accounts that would otherwise come to light. Moreover, it prevents a
defendant from presenting an alibi defense. Accurate answers to distance questions are
likewise of key importance to fact-finders. How much weight a Trial Chamber can justifiably
place on a witness's identification of a defendant at a particular scene will largely depend
on how far the witness was from the defendant. A Trial Chamber hearing only that "the
distance was not great" is making factual findings in the dark. As for maps, photographs,
and sketches, defense counsel frequently show witnesses these representations to test the
witness's memory or to challenge whether the witness was even present at the site. But if
the witness says she cannot understand the picture, then there is no way to tell if she was
there or not. Even if the Trial Chamber is sure that the witness was there, it might wish to
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pinpoint her exact location in order to assess the weight to give to her testimony. One ICTR
witness, for instance, was able to point out her position on a photograph of a stadium, and
because she was able to do so, the Trial Chamber was able to determine that she could not
have identified anyone located where the witness said the defendant was located.
Sometimes questions go unanswered not because the witnesses do not know the answers,
but because the witnesses do not understand the questions they are asked, or the Western
court personnel do not understand the answers that they receive. Sometimes the witness will
not understand the terminology used in the question, and at other times it is the form of the
question that gives rise to difficulties. Sometimes it is not clear what the problem is, but it
is clear that some problem exists because the witness's answer will not in any way match
counsel's question. In other cases, the communication difficulty will become apparent because
counsel must ask a question multiple times in order to get a responsive answer from the
witness. And it is not infrequent for counsel never to get a pertinent answer, as witnesses
frequently seem to talk around the relevant topics.
A final problem concerns testimony that is inconsistent with previous statements. Investigators interview witnesses before they come to court, and they draft written statements ostensibly
containing the information that the witnesses conveyed to them. The problem is that a
substantial proportion of witnesses testify inconsistently with their written statements or with
their in-court testimony in previous cases. While some of these inconsistencies are trivial,
many are not. As Chapter Four of my book reveals, the inconsistencies cover a wide range
of information. Discrepancies are particularly apt to appear in testimony that concerns dates,
distance, duration, numerical estimations, and the other sorts of key details that international
witnesses have such trouble providing. In other cases, the inconsistencies concern the specific
facts of the crime and even the defendant's involvement in the crime. These sorts of inconsistencies would be troubling enough if they happened only occasionally, but in reviewing the
transcripts of all of the SCSL cases and a handful of ICTR cases, I found that, on average,
approximately 50 percent of witness testimony was seriously inconsistent with past statements.
Having summarily canvassed the impediments bedeviling international criminal trials, let
me now briefly mention some of the causes of those impediments. The most obvious factor
is lack of education and relevant life experiences. A substantial proportion of witnesses are
illiterate and have had no or virtually no formal education. Because many of these witnesses
not only do not know how to read and write, but also have never been taught to tell time
or to measure, it can come as no surprise when these witnesses are unable to answer many
of the questions put to them. Cultural differences between the witnesses and Western court
personnel also prove an additional impediment to accurate fact-finding. Indeed, an inability
to answer certain questions may be driven less by educational factors than by cultural factors.
My book canvasses the work of several anthropologists who show that many cultures do
not attach the same importance to dates, distances, and other objective units of measure as
we do in West. Taboos can also prevent clear, forthright testimony, and culture can frequently
influence the style of answering questions, as some groups speak in a more indirect fashion
than that which is customary in the West. Because Western speech patterns tend to be
relatively direct, witnesses who provide indirect, circuitous answers are often thought at best
to lack confidence in their perceptions, and at worst to be deceptive. Such inferences are
obviously not appropriate with respect to witnesses from certain cultures, but because the
trial judges often are not intimately familiar with the culture in question, they are left not
knowing what speech signals or demeanor clues should give rise to concern. Finally, the
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fact that virtually all testimony must go through one or more rounds of language interpretation
only exacerbates the problems already mentioned.
The explanations just canvassed can be deemed "innocent." The problem is that many
of these same phenomena can also be plausibly explained as purposeful efforts to conceal.
Indeed, the very fact that questioning at the international tribunals seems so frequently
bedeviled by educational deficits, interpretation errors, and cultural divergences means that
witnesses can invoke these communication impediments even when they are not in play, as
a means of concealing lying, inconsistencies, or other weaknesses in witness testimony.
International witnesses who are falsely accusing a defendant may, for instance, find it useful
to provide a vague account, devoid of meaningful details. Dating events permits a defendant
to contradict the witness's testimony, so it may prove safer for the witness to claim that he
does not know the relevant dates. Making distance and numerical estimates can likewise
leave a witness vulnerable to contradiction, so they too are better left unstated. The same
goes for the numerous examples of frustrating exchanges and unresponsive responses. While
these may reflect confusion about terminology or a cultural proclivity toward indirect speech,
they may also reflect a witness's desire to evade the question at hand, or at least to buy
some time to consider the answer he wishes to give.
There is no way to determine whether a particular testimonial problem results from perjury
or one of the many innocent explanations, but I did consider whether perjury seems in general
to be a problem at the international tribunals, and I conclude that at some tribunals, it is.
Some witnesses outright admit that they lied in their testimony or in their written statements.
Moreover, we can tell that false testimony is prevalent at the ICTR in particular because my
review of the transcripts and judgments reveals that virtually every ICTR case has featured
either an alibi or some other form of blatant contradiction between witnesses for the defense
and for the prosecution. Certainly, some of the instances of contradictory testimony probably
reflect poor memory and perception, rather than perjury, but conflicting testimony is so
prevalent in ICTR cases that it would be hard to dismiss all-or even a significant percentage-of it as the result of honest mistakes.
In the remainder of the book, I explore the implications of these empirical findings. I
compare transcripts to judgments to reveal the way in which the Trial Chambers treat the
testimonial deficiencies that I describe, and I construct what I believe is a compelling
explanation for that treatment. In the book's final two chapters, I address various normative
questions, including the most crucial: whether the testimonial deficiencies I identify fundamentally undermine the international criminal justice. I am sorry that time does not permit
me to discuss those issues here, but I am eager to hear the comments of my esteemed
colleagues.
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